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In the 1990s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) ag-
gressively encouraged and/or stipulated the opening up of the econo-
mies of the developing countries to unhindered movement of capitalfrom the developed world. It did this (1) through surveillance consul-
tations conducted annually with its member countries (Article IV Con-
sultations), and (2) by stipulating policy and structural conditions in
its financial program arrangements with the member countries (Con-
ditionalities). Analysis of the IMF's Articles of Agreement and its
program arrangements with Korea, Thailand and Indonesia during
the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 reveals that the IMF's insistence
on capital account convertibility was untenable and beyond its man-
date. Furthermore, proliferation in the Conditionalities after the
Washington Consensus, 1989, and its rollback after the Monterrey
Consensus, 2002, testifies to the IMF's political subjugation and the
economic philosophies of its major stockholders. To gain acceptabil-
ity in the developing world, the IMF needs to realign itself to the grow-
ing role of the emerging markets in the world economy, restructure its
governance by having a decision-making process independent of its
ownership, and then look at de jure expansion of its oversight from
international current to capital account transactions.
I. INTRODUCTION
HE IMF actively engages with almost all of its 184 member coun-
tries on matters of macro-economic policy and financial sector de-
velopment, but yet remains extremely unpopular in the developing
world. A string of financial crises since the 1990s, in Mexico, Korea, In-
donesia, Thailand, Russia, Brazil, Argentina et al, attributable in varying
degrees to the structural reforms insisted upon by the IMF in these coun-
tries, has severely battered its neutral credentials. The governments of
the developing countries may find it convenient to shift the blame for
their economic mismanagement onto the IMF, but it does merit a review
if the IMF has stretched its mandate by imposing structural conditions
extraneous to its financing. This paper explores, in the context of the
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98, one such structural condition: the capi-
* Ramit Nagpal graduated from Harvard Law School in 2005.
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tal account convertibility. It seeks to ascertain the validity of the IMF's
actions under its Articles of Agreement and also the influence of the 1989
Washington Consensus1 , and the 2002 Monterrey Consensus2 on the con-
ditions it stipulates for its assistance.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the
scope of the IMF's Articles of Agreement and the basis of the Condition-
alities; Part III analyzes the IMF's commitment to the cause of capital
account convertibility during the Asian Financial Crisis as experienced in
Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia; Part IV reviews the linkage of the Con-
ditionalities to the Washington Consensus and to its rollback after the
Monterrey Consensus; and Part V concludes.
II. ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT; CONDITIONALITIES
A. SCOPE
The IMF's primary mission since its inception in 1945 has been to
maintain international stability in foreign exchange rates, avoid competi-
tive currency devaluations, and eliminate foreign exchange restrictions
and barriers to current account transactions in order to foster interna-
tional trade and economic growth. Article I of its charter, the Articles of
Agreement, lays down the parameters that the IMF is required to operate
under:
" To promote international monetary cooperation through a perma-
nent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and
collaboration on international monetary problems.
* To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance
of high levels of employment and real income and to the develop-
ment of the productive resources of all members as primary objec-
tives of economic policy.
" To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange ar-
rangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange
depreciation.
" To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in
respect of current transactions between members and in the elimina-
1. The Washington Consensus was a set of ten policy prescriptions for Latin America,
which later became synonymous with globalization and market fundamentalist
movement. See JOHN WILLIAMSON, LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH
HAS HAPPENED? (John Williamson ed., Institute for International Economics
1990), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=
486 [hereinafter LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT]; see also John Williamson, What
Should the World Bank Think About the Washington Consensus?, 15 THE WORLD
BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 251 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/
research/journals/wbro/obsaugOO/pdf/(6)Williamson.pdf.
2. The Monterrey Consensus sought to build a global economy through a new part-
nership between developed and developing economies. See generally United Na-
tions, Int'l Conference on Financing for Development, Mar. 18-22, 2002, Report of
the International Conference on Financing for Development (2002), U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.198/11, available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/aconfl98-11.pdf.
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tion of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of
world trade.
" To give confidence to members by making the general resources of
the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards,
thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in
their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive
of national or international prosperity.
" In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the
degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of
members.3
In order to meet its objectives, the IMF provides (1) financial assis-
tance to correct balance of payment problems; (2) surveillance consulta-
tions to monitor macro-economic and financial sector developments and
policies at a global, regional, and country level; and (3) technical assis-
tance to the governments and central banks of the member countries.4
IMF member countries are obligated under article IV, section 1 of the
Articles of Agreement to direct their economic and financial policies to
achieve orderly economic growth without erratic disruptions. 5 More spe-
cifically, each member commits under article VIII of the Articles of
Agreement, subject to certain exceptions provided therein and in article
XIV, not to "impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers
for current international transactions," 6 nor to "engage in, any discrimi-
natory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices,... except
as authorized under this Agreement or approved by the Fund."' 7 Article
VI, section 3, clarifies that members countries "may exercise such con-
trols as are necessary to regulate international capital movements," but
not in a manner that "will restrict payments for current transactions" ex-
cept to tide over temporary scarcity in currency as provided in article VII,
section 3(b) and for the transition phase as provided in article XIV, sec-
tion 2.8
To ensure compliance with the above, the IMF has the right under arti-
cle IV, section 3, of the Articles of Agreement, to "exercise firm surveil-
lance over the exchange rate policies of members."9 Each member
country is obligated to provide the IMF with the information necessary
for such surveillance and to consult with it on its exchange rate policies.' 0
The IMF is duty bound to "respect the domestic social and political poli-
3. IMF, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, (July 22, 1944)
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.
4. See generally IMF, What is the International Monetary Fund?, http://imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm (updated July 30, 2004).
5. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note 3, art. IV,
sec. 2.
6. Id. art. VIII.
7. Id.
8. Id. art. VI, sec. 3.
9. Id., art. IV, sec. 3.
10. Id.
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cies of members, and ... the circumstances of members."'1 Under article
IV of the Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with
member countries every year to collect economic and financial informa-
tion and discuss the country's economic development and policies. 12 In
other words, the appraisal of a member country's exchange rate policies
is made within the framework of the general economic situation and eco-
nomic policies of the member country. These are commonly known as
Article IV Consultations 13 and a play a significant role in shaping the
economic policies of the member countries.
B. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
The IMF's core responsibility is to provide short term financial assis-
tance to countries experiencing balance of payment problems. This en-
ables countries to rebuild their international reserves, continue paying for
imports, and restore conditions for economic growth.' 4
Over the years, the IMF has developed a number of financial assistance
facilities. Low-income countries can borrow at a concessional interest
rate of 0.5 percent through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility,
which is required to be repaid over a period of five and a half to ten
years.15 The IMF provides non-concessional loans through the following
main facilities: (1) Stand-by Arrangements, (2) the Extended Fund Facil-
ity, (3) the Supplemental Reserve Facility, (4) the Compensation Financ-
ing Facility, and (5) Emergency Assistance.16 Stand-By Arrangements
"help countries address short-term balance-of-payments problems.' 17
These arrangements are typically for a length of twelve to eighteen
months and are to be repaid within two-and-a-half to four years.18 The
Extended Fund Facility "help[s] countries address more protracted bal-
ance-of-payments problems."' 19 These arrangements are usually for three
years, with repayment expected within four-and-a-half to seven years.20
The Supplemental Reserve Facility was introduced in 1997 to bail out
crisis-hit countries experiencing large and sudden outflows of capital.2'
These arrangements are expected to be repaid within two to two-and-a-
half years. 22 The Compensatory Financing Facility "was established in
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. IMF, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR
ENDED APRIL 30, 2005 13-14 (2005), available at http://www.imf.org/externalpubs/
ft/aa/index.htm.
14. See What is the International Monetary Fund?, supra note 4.
15. IMF, The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) (Mar. 2005), available at
http://www.imf.org/externalgnp/exr/facts/prgf.htm.
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1963 to assist countries experiencing either a sudden shortfall in export
earnings or an increase in the cost of cereal imports caused by fluctuating
world commodity prices."' 23 Finally, Emergency Assistance was estab-
lished to support recovery from natural disasters and conflicts, and is ex-
pected to be repaid within three-and-a-quarter to five years.24
The IMF usually provides its financial assistance under an arrangement
that sets out "the specific policies and measures a country has agreed to
implement in order to resolve its balance of payments problem. ' 25 This
arrangement, formulated by the member country and the IMF together,
is manifest in a Letter of Intent and may be accompanied by other docu-
ments such as Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies or other
policy framework papers.2 6
C. CONDITIONALITIES
Since the IMF does not finance specific projects or activities, its lending
is conditional on policies that the borrowing country must adopt in order
to correct its balance of payments problem. 27 Conditionality is a central
feature in the IMF's involvement with its member countries.28 This is to
ensure that the borrowing country repays the loan by strengthening its
economy and removing the root causes for its balance of payment
problems.29 The IMF's "financing and policy adjustments by the [mem-
ber] country are intended to be two sides of a common response to exter-
nal imbalances. '30 Thus, it provides safeguards to the IMF "to ensure
that successive tranches of financing are delivered only if key policies are
on track. '31 It also provides assurances to the borrowing "country that it
will continue to receive the Fund's financing ... [if] it continues to imple-
ment the policies envisaged" 32. The funds are, therefore, disbursed in a
phased manner linked to the borrowing country meeting its scheduled
policy commitments.
The legal basis for the Conditionality stipulated by the IMF on a bor-
rower country flows from the following provisions in the Articles of
Agreement:
* Article I: The IMF is mandated to make "the general resources of
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33. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note 3, art. I.
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" Article V, section 3: The IMF is authorized to adopt general policies
on the use of its general resources and to adopt special policies that
will assist members to solve their balance of payments problems in a
manner consistent with the IMF's articles; 34 and
" Article XXX (b): All the conditions for access to the IMF's resources
are spelled out in the self-contained arrangements. A decision of the
IMF that a member is assured that it will be able to access the financ-
ing "in accordance with the terms of the decision during a specified
period and up to a specified amount. '35
Conditionality may be in the form of (1) Prior Action: i.e., a prior mea-
sure that the member country agrees to take before the loan is ap-
proved.36 "Prior actions could include ...adjustment of the exchange
rate . . . [and] elimination of price controls. ' 37 (2) Performance Criteria:
these are specific conditions that have to be met for the agreed amount of
credit to be disbursed. 38  These could be both quantitative
("macroeconomic policy variables such as international reserves... [and]
fiscal balances" 39) and structural ("specific measures to improve financial
sector operations ... or restructure key sectors such as energy" or pen-
sions);40 (3) Structural Benchmarks: these "are used for measures that
cannot be monitored objectively enough to be [performance criteria]; '41
and (4) Program Review: this is a monitoring tool for a broad-based as-
sessment by the IMF of the "progress toward the program's objectives. '42
The scope of Conditionality was defined by the Guidelines on Condi-
tionality issued by the IMF on March 2, 1979,43 which provide, inter alia,
that
The number and content of performance criteria may vary because
of the diversity of problems and institutional arrangements of mem-
bers. Performance criteria will be limited to those that are necessary
to evaluate implementation of the program with a view to ensuring
the achievement of its objectives. Performance criteria will normally
be confined to (i) macroeconomic variables, and (ii) those necessary
to implement specific provisions of the Articles or policies adopted
under them. Performance criteria may relate to other variables only
in exceptional cases when they are essential for the effectiveness of
the member's program because of their macroeconomic impact. 44
34. Id. art. V.
35. Id., art. XXX.








43. IMF, Policy Development and Review Dep't, Conditionality in Fund-Supported
Programs-Policy Issues (Feb. 16 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
pdr/cond/2001/eng/policy/021601.pdf (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 6.
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Therefore, while designing its Conditionality, the IMF was to be guided
by two considerations: (1) the conditions must help the member "to solve
their balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with" 45 the
purposes of the IMF while safeguarding the IMF's resources, and (2) the
conditions are only those necessary to achieve those purposes (to prevent
intrusion in a member's exercise of its sovereign powers). 46
Interestingly, "[slome element of policy conditionality has been at-
tached to Fund financing since the mid-1950s, but the scope of condition-
ality has expanded, particularly since the early 1980s," '47 and, more
specifically, in the 1990s. 48 Another notable development is the expan-
sion of Conditionalities in the structural area, as demonstrated in the fig-
ure below, which was not common in IMIF-supported programs earlier.
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Source: International Monetary Fund
The proliferation in structural Conditionalities extended from macro-
critical to other areas as well. The exchange and trade-related Condition-
alities saw a steady decline from 1987-90 to 1997-99 and capital account
related Conditionalities started to increase from 1991-93. The fiscal sec-
tor and financial sector saw the bulk of structural conditions and priva-
tization and systemic reform-related Conditionalities continued to grow
steadily from 1991 to 1999 (see figure below).
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id.
47. Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs-Overview, supra note 27.
48. Id. Fig. 1.
49. Id.
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Distribution of Structural Conditions by Economic Sector (as percent-
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The IMF attributed the proliferation in the structural conditions to (1)
its realization that the monetary and fiscal policy objectives key to macro-
economic adjustments for sustainable economic growth are themselves
dependent on structural conditions, and (2) its involvement in alleviation
of structural imbalances in low-income countries, crisis-hit countries in
Asia, and the transition economies of Eastern Europe.51
In a nutshell, the IMF, by its Articles of Agreement, has jurisdiction
over current account transactions of its member countries. It is not em-
powered to require opening up of the capital account by its member
countries. The only exception is article VI, section 3, which cautions that
a member country may not regulate its international capital movements
in a manner that restricts payments for current transactions, such as those
that may lead to distortion in exchange rates. But capital account Condi-
tionality came into play from 1991 to 1999. Albeit small in its dispersion
relative to other structural conditions, its potency was acutely felt during
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-98. While the proliferation in struc-
tural Conditionalities by the IMF was justified in response to changing
market conditions, it remains a moot point if these were minimum condi-
tions necessary for provision of financing by the IMIF as required by the
1979 Guidelines, or if they contained policy prescriptions for the member
countries that went beyond the IMF's mandate.
50. Id. Fig. 3.
51. Id.
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III. CAPITAL ACCOUNT CONVERTIBILITY IN THE ASIAN
FINANCIAL CRISIS
Through the medium of Article IV Consultations and the Conditionali-
ties, the IMF requires a member country to take action on issues that
impact macro-economic performance (interest rates, money, credit, infla-
tion, exchange rates, and balance of payments etc.) and financial sector
development (including regulation and supervision of financial institu-
tions). While doing this, the IMIF is required to take into account the
domestic social policies, political policies, and the circumstances of mem-
ber countries. This makes for an interesting review in the context of the
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98. It is by now well-documented that lib-
eralization of the capital account in the affected Asian countries was pre-
mature, i.e. neither "well sequenced nor accompanied by ... [a] strong
prudential supervision of the financial system,"52 thereby leaving these
economies vulnerable. In fact, "[t]he vulnerabilities of the economy to
external events stemming from weaknesses in the corporate and financial
sectors were not fully recognized. ' '53 In other words, ill-timed capital ac-
count liberalization, irrespective of the readiness of the economy, re-
sulted in deceptively large inflows of foreign capital-both short-term and
reversible. This shielded the fundamental underlying problems, which
eventually caused a shift in the foreign investor sentiment, triggering mas-
sive capital outflows and resulting in tragic economic and social losses
across Asia.54 Yet, the IMF's Conditionality for assistance was, inter alia,
a further and unrestricted opening of the capital account in the hardest
hit Asian Crisis countries-Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia.55
A. KOREA
Until the financial crisis in 1997, Korea had experienced a long period
of rapid growth, which transformed it into an advanced industrial econ-
omy. But the Korean government had begun an economic reform pro-
gram, which gained momentum in 1993-96, to gradually liberalize
financial markets and the capital account. In its 1997 Annual Report, the
IMF summarized its Article IV Consultations with Korea by stating that:
'The fiscal situation in Korea remained sound as the result of a long tra-
52. Press Release, IMF, IMF Concludes Article IV Constitution with Korea (June 19,
1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1998/pn9839.htm.
53. Id.
54. I am not suggesting that other factors such as political issues, bad governance, and
lack of transparency in financial and economic data were not also responsible. See
generally IMF, The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis (Jan. 1999), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.htm.
55. This paper does not seek to ascertain the causes of the Asian Financial Crisis nor
the adequacy of the IMF response. Much has already been said and written about
it. The focus is on the IMF's handling of its Conditionality of capital account
convertibility.
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dition of fiscal conservatism. ' 56 The report also stated that directors of
the fund welcomed the recent acceleration of capital account liberaliza-
tion; although some Directors agreed with the authorities' gradual ap-
proach to capital account liberalization, a number of Directors
considered that rapid and complete liberalization offered many benefits
at Korea's stage of economic development. Directors agreed with the
authorities' intention of not rigidly linking capital account liberalization
to the narrowing of interest differentials with partner countries and noted
that liberalization itself would be important in reducing Korean interest
rates from the current high levels. 57
It is pertinent to note, however, that the acceleration of capital account
liberalization hastened portfolio investments and short-term inter-bank
debt over long term foreign direct investment. 58 In fact, in the few years
leading up to the crisis, movement of foreign direct investment vis-A-vis
the inflow of "hot money" makes a very interesting comparison:
(in billion USD) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Direct investment -0.5 -1.3 -1.9 - -
Portfolio investment 10.7 6.8 8.5
External Debt
(%of GDP) 13.3 14.7 17.2 32.5 34.9
Source: The International Monetary Fund*
* See 1997 IMF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 59.
High domestic interest rates (to maintain dollar-pegged exchange
rates) attracted inflow of short-term foreign capital. Borrowings from the
foreign markets, made possible by relaxation in capital account restric-
tions, financed the over zealous domestic credit expansion 59 and led Ko-
rea to become highly leveraged. Loan defaults by the Korean
conglomerates triggered a loss of confidence leading to large outflows,
depleting foreign reserves, and raising the specter of sovereign
bankruptcy.
The IMF stepped in with a package of economic reforms manifest in
various Letters of Intent6° that provided for, inter alia, macro-economic,
fiscal, and financial sector measures; for example: restructuring of finan-
56. IMF, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR
ENDED APRIL 30, 1997 59 (1997), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
ar/97/pdf/fileO5.pdf [hereinafter 1997 IMF ANNUAL REPORT].
57. Id. at 60.
58. See Press Release, IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Korea, supra note
52.
59. See generally Kar-Yiu Wong, Firm Failure and Financial Crisis: The Experience of
South Korea, 1 J. OF KOREAN ECON. 23, 23-51 (2000), available at http://faculty.
washington.edu/karyiu/papers/korea-ch.pdf.
60. See IMF, Korea Letters of Intent (Dec 24, 1997), (Feb. 7, 1998), (May 2, 1998), (July
24, 1998), (Nov. 13, 1998), available at http://imf.org/external/ns/search.aspx?New
Query=Korea+Letter+of+Intent.
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cial sector and large conglomerates, debt workouts, etc; accommodation
of larger fiscal deficits to provide for financial restructuring, recession,
and to allow for higher expenditure on the social safety program and un-
employment benefits; and capital market development through privatiza-
tion of government enterprises. Among others, the trade and capital
account liberalizations required of Korea at the time of the crisis were:
" Trade liberalization measures: these included setting a timetable in
line with WTO commitments to eliminate trade related subsidies and
import diversification programs; and permitting foreigners to engage
in securities dealings, insurance, leasing, property-related businesses
and in deep sea foreign transport.
" Capital account liberalization measures: these included permitting
foreign investment without restriction in domestic money, equity,
and bond markets; removal of sectoral caps on foreign direct invest-
ment in various sectors such as newspapers, periodicals, and telecom;
increasing the range and amounts of financial instruments available
to foreign investors; permitting foreign financial institutions to par-
ticipate in mergers and acquisitions of domestic financial institutions;
permitting foreign banks to purchase equity in domestic banks with-
out restriction; and abolishing restrictions on foreign ownership of
land and real estate properties.61
In other words, while indeed providing macro-economic, fiscal, and fi-
nancial relief, the IMF appeared to be leveraging its position to extract
capital account concessions beyond its mandate enshrined in its Articles
of Agreement. The argument that these concessions would make foreign
investors return to Korea is plausible, but at the same time highly specu-
lative and debatable under the circumstances.
B. THAILAND AND INDONESIA
Stepping back to Thailand in 1997, the Thai baht was coming under a
series of speculative attacks with foreign investors who were losing confi-
dence in the economy. In Thailand, the combination of a fixed exchange
rate, an increasingly open capital account, and high domestic interest
rates to combat inflation attracted short-term capital flows that left the
economy vulnerable to sudden shifts in market sentiment and external
shocks. 62 The IMF's program policies for Thailand kept evolving in re-
sponse to the worsening crisis.63 At its core was the comprehensive re-
structuring of the financial sector, the strengthening of the fiscal position,
and the strengthening of the legal and institutional framework for corpo-
rate debt restructuring. Other policies were supportive of external cur-
61. See id.
62. See IMF, Thailand Letter of Intent (Aug. 14, 1997), available at http://imf.org/exter-
nal/np/loi/081497.htm.
63. See id.; IMF, Thailand Letters of Intent (Nov. 25, 1997), (Feb. 24, 1998), (May 26,
1998), (Aug. 25, 1998), (Dec. 1, 1998), available at http://imf.org/external/ns/search.
aspx?NewQuery=Thailand+letter+of+intent.
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rent account adjustment, strengthening of the social safety net, and
structural reforms-notably civil service-and further opening of Thai-
land's economy to foreign investment through privatization and the con-
version of the Alien Business Law into a new and more liberal foreign
investment law.
The shift in market sentiment in Thailand also exposed structural
weaknesses in Indonesia's economy, notably the large amount of short-
term foreign debt owed by the private corporate sector. Indonesia, un-
like Korea, had already liberalized extensively on the capital account.
Rapid expansion of the financial system since the late 1980s had left a
number of banks with significant amounts of non-performing loans,
straining their liquidity and undermining their financial viability. Also,
the relative stability of the Indonesian rupiah during most of the 1990s,
together with the high rates of return on domestic investment, both en-
couraged and facilitated high levels of unhedged overseas borrowing, a
significant portion that was private short-term debt. "Consequently, by
end-June 1997, Indonesia's external debt had increased to $140 billion
(about 60 percent of GDP), of which $33 billion was short term."'64
The IMF's program for economic reform in Indonesia provided for the
macro-economic, fiscal, social, and financial sector measures to stabilize
the economy. 65 Some measures, however, merit additional scrutiny, such
as cancellation of several infrastructure projects and controversial discon-
tinuation of the airplane and national car projects. 6 6 The IMF also sought
the elimination of existing foreign ownership restrictions on banks, the
further liberalization of foreign trade and investment, the dismantling of
domestic monopolies, and the expansion of the privatization program.
Trade measures included reduction in, or phasing out of, tariffs and quan-
titative import restrictions, and other non-tariff barriers that protect do-
mestic production. For example, consistent with Indonesia's commitment
to the WTO, the local content program for motor vehicles, which gives
preferential tariff rates to vehicle manufacturers using a high percentage
of local parts, was to be phased out by 2000. The list of activities open to
foreign investors was to be further expanded and the restrictions were to
64. IMF, Indonesia Letter of Intent-Memorandum of Economic and Financial Poli-
cies (Oct. 31, 1997), at 3, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/103197.
HTM.
65. See generally IMF, Indonesia and the IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/country/
IDN/index.htm. The economic program comprises the Letter of Intent of October
31, 1997; the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies issued on January
15, 1998; Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of
April 10, 1998; Second Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial
Policies of June 24, 1998; Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and
Financial Policies of July 29, 1998; Letter of Intent and Supplementary Memoran-
dum of Economic and Financial Policies issued on September 11, 1998; Letter of
Intent and Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of
October 19, 1998; and Letter of Intent and Supplementary Memorandum of Eco-
nomic and Financial Policies of November 13. 1998.
66. Ostensibly to conserve government expenditure.
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be removed in the wholesale and retail sector.67
The IMF's relentless pursuit to extract capital account concessions at
the time of the crisis does appear opportunistic. The virtually coercive
requirement of large scale liberalization of trade and investment policies
(which otherwise were part of the WTO framework) and the unrestricted
opening of the capital account imposed by the IMF, irrespective of their
local conditions in these countries, not only exceeded its mandate under
its Articles of Agreement, but also made the developing world question
the IMF's agenda at the time of the crisis.
At the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Interim Committee (as it was then
called) of the Board of Governors, the IMF toyed with the idea of an
amendment to the Articles of Agreement to include liberalization of cap-
ital movements as one of the purposes of the IMF, or at least to have an
express power to impose capital liberalization as an IMF Conditionality.68
A further emphatic pitch to attribute the Asian Financial Crisis to im-
proper sequencing of capital account liberalization (and not capital ac-
count liberalization per se) was made by Michel Camdessus, Managing
Director of the IMF in March 1998,69 but with Asian countries sinking
further in a downward spiral the matter was put on a back burner.
The IMF was instrumental in restoration of investor confidence in the
affected countries under the umbrella of its bailouts, which amounted to
U.S. $36.3 billion for Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. The IMF also
spearheaded the mobilization of U.S. $81.6 billion of additional financing
from multilateral and bilateral sources in support of these reform pro-
grams. But scars of its excesses ran deep-the IMF pushed too far beyond
its mandate, ostensibly at the behest of its major stockholders, and its
credibility as a guardian of the international monetary system was at an
all time low in the developing world.
IV. WASHINGTON CONSENSUS; MONTERREY CONSENSUS
Admittedly he who pays the piper calls the tune, but a multilateral fi-
nancial institution charged with maintaining stability in the international
payment systems cannot sustain the cooperation of the changing world
order if it continues to be perceived as owing allegiance to its major
stockholders. Through the 1990s, the IMF's economic medicine for the
developing world was a standard prescription: remove barriers to foreign
investment, remove capital account restrictions, liberalize financial sector,
and privatize. The roots of this ran deep into the Washington Consensus
in 1989. A series of crises followed, but it was not until the IMF's poster
67. See IMF, Indonesia Letter of Intent (Oct. 31, 1997), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/loi/103197.htm#memo.
68. See Francois Gianviti, Evolving Role And Challenges For The International Mone-
tary Fund, 35 INT'L LAW. 1371 (2001).
69. Michel Camdessus, IMF Managing Director, Capital Account Liberalization and
the Role of the Fund, Remarks at the IMF Seminar on Capital Account Liberali-
zation in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 9, 1998), available at http://www.imf.org/externalU
np/speeches/1998/030998.htm.
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child, Argentina, collapsed in 2001 that the IMF sought to review its prac-
tice of Conditionalities against the backdrop of immense negativity sur-
rounding its operations. The Monterrey Consensus in 2002 provided the
IMF with an opportunity to regain its credibility. But clearly more needs
to be done.
A. WASHINGTON CONSENSUS
Briefly, the Washington Consensus was a set of policy prescriptions for
fostering economic growth in Latin America, summarized as follows:
" Fiscal discipline;
" A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering
both high economic returns and the potential to improve income dis-
tribution, such as primary health care, primary education, and
infrastructure;
" Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base);
" Interest rate liberalization;
" A competitive exchange rate;
" Trade liberalization;
" Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment;
" Privatization;
" Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit); and
" Secure property rights. 70
John Williamson, from the International Institute of Economics, who is
credited with coining the phrase "Washington Consensus," meant the
phrase to refer to the lowest common denominator of policy advice being
addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin American coun-
tries as of 1989.71 But this later morphed into a neo-liberal movement
and became the IMF's mantra for the rest of the developing world. 72 The
IMF's actions during the Asian Financial Crisis regarding Korea, Thai-
land, and Indonesia strongly hint at indiscriminate implementation of
policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus.
B. NEGATIVITY
It is virtually impossible to capture the width of criticism faced by the
IMF but this section will provide a flavor.
It is useful to recall the words of Mr. Francois Gianviti, former General
Counsel of the IMF:
The drafters of the Fund's Articles were ambitious but they were
also realistic. After the end of World War II, an immediate priority
was the resumption of multilateral trade, which required a liberaliza-
tion of current payments, but a premature liberalization of capital
movements could have undermined the fragile post-war economies.
70. LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT, supra note 1, ch. 2.
71. Williamson, supra note 1, at 251.
72. Id.
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Therefore, the sovereignty of members with respect to exchange con-
trols on capital movements was preserved; restrictions on capital
movements could be imposed without Fund approval. 73
But after four decades of stabilization, the IMF and its major stock-
holders apparently thought it fit to require premature liberalization of
capital accounts in other fragile developing countries. In fact, Budhoo
Davison, who resigned as senior manager at the IMF in 1989 after twelve
years service, stated:
President Reagan effectively told us to go out and make the Third
World a bastion of free-wheeling capitalism... Everything we did
from 1983 onward was based on our new sense of mission to have the
'south' privatize or die; towards this end we created economic bed-
lam in Latin America and Africa in 1983-88.74
Since the Asian Financial Crisis, the criticism of the IMF has been even
more scathing, bitter, and unforgiving. Seen as an extension of the U.S.
Treasury, the IMF has been considered intrusive and unfair, leveraging its
position to push G-5 (or G-7) economic agenda on the developing
world.75 The evidence against the IMF is overwhelming: an increase in
structural Conditionalities after the Washington Consensus; indiscrimi-
nate prescription of liberalization of trade, investment, capital account
convertibility, and privatization irrespective of the underlying facts and
circumstances; and unfair extraction of extraneous concessions in crisis.
C. MONTERREY CONSENSUS; CONDITIONALITY ROLLBACK
Many a crisis later, the International Conference on Financing for De-
velopment held in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002 had a more benign
feel. Its goal was "to eradicate poverty, achieve sustained economic
growth and promote sustainable development as we advance to a fully
inclusive and equitable global economic system."'76 The Monterrey Con-
sensus sought to build a new partnership between the developed and de-
veloping countries, whereby the reforms for globalization were
implemented on a mutually beneficial basis and with a better comprehen-
sion of the issues faced in the developing countries.
Thereafter, in September 2002, the IMF revised its Conditionality
73. Gianviti, supra note 69, at 1375.
74. Budhoo Davison, Open Letter of Resignation from the Staff of the IMF, in MAR-
TIN, BRENDAN, IN the Public Interest? Privatisation and Public Sector Reform
(Zed Books 1993).
75. Dr. Walden Bello, Professor of Sociology and Public Administration at the Uni-
versity of Philippines, has been a staunch critic. See generally, Walden Bello, The
Future in the Balance, Acceptance Speech at the Right Livelihood Award Cere-
monies, Swedish Parliament, Stockholm (Dec. 8, 2003), available at http://www.
international.ucla.edu/asia/article.aspparentid=5008.
76. United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development, Mar 18-
22, 2002, Draft Outcome of the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.198/3, Annex T 1,
available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/aconfl98-3.pdf.
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Guidelines77 with the objectives of sharply focusing on macroeconomic
and financial sector policies based on principles of parsimony, criticality,
and necessity; being less intrusive into countries' policy choices; requiring
country ownership of policy programs; and having due regard to the so-
cial and political objectives, economic realities, and circumstances of the
member countries. 78 In particular:
Conditions will normally consist of macroeconomic variables and
structural measures that are within the Fund's core areas of responsi-
bility. Variables and measures that are outside the Fund's core areas
of responsibility may also be established as conditions but may re-
quire more detailed explanation of their critical importance. The
Fund's core areas of responsibility in this context comprise:
macroeconomic stabilization; monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate
policies, including the underlying institutional arrangements and
closely related structural measures; and financial system issues re-
lated to the functioning of both domestic and international financial
markets.79
Subsequently, the IMF's de facto mission of seeking capital account
convertibility in the developing world was modified to promote and sup-
port the gradual and orderly liberalization of the capital account with due
regard to the domestic macro-economic, fiscal, social, and political
factors.
To the extent that the 2002 Guidelines have, in fact, been implemented
is outside the scope of this paper, but Mr. P. Chidambaram, Finance Min-
ister for the Government of India, in his speech to the International Mon-
etary and Finance Committee of the IMF on April 16, 2005,80 strongly
hinted at the developing world's continuing discontent with the IMF,
stating:
" [The] Fund's insistence on the pursuit of sound policies and institu-
tions in low income countries should be grounded on the right prem-
ises. The primary focus of Fund support to low-income countries
should be based on its core area of expertise, namely helping them
establish and maintain macroeconomic and financial stability.
" It would be premature to bring capital account liberalization as a
central focus of the Fund, on par with current account transactions.
" [I]t is also felt that the Fund is becoming increasingly intrusive in its
approach and using surveillance as an instrument to rate country
77. IMF, Policy Development and Review Dep't, Review of the 2002 Conditionality
Guidelines-Selected Issues (Mar 4, 2005), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/pp/eng/2005/030405.pdf.
78. IMF, Guidelines on Conditionality (Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/
External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/92302.htm.
79. Id.
80. P. Chidambaram, Statement by Honourable Finance Minister Mr. P.
Chidambaram Leader of the Indian Delegation to the IMFC, On Behalf of Ban-
gladesh, Bhutan, India and Sri Lanka (April 16, 2005), available at http://www.imf.
org/External/spring/2005/imfc/stmt/eng/ind.pdf.
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performance, thereby subordinating its primary role of a confidential
advisor and the co-operative principles underlying its existence.
" [T]he 'proliferation' of Fund conditionality into areas outside the
Fund's core responsibilities based on the notion of 'everything de-
pends on everything else' must be eschewed.
" [T]he prerogative of the Fund to protect its own resources, when its
portfolio is highly exposed to a few select debtor members and
should not be construed to justify the dilution of the principles of
'criticality', 'parsimony' and 'clarity' to the old 'everything depends
on everything else' norm. 81
D. REGAINING CREDIBILITY
Disconnects between the IMF and the developing countries are several
and fundamental. The IMF's decision-making has always been dictated
by the political and economic agenda of its major stockholders, with the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan collec-
tively cornering 39.1 percent of the voting power.82 While the IMF's op-
erations have evolved and adapted since 1945 to new developments in the
global economy, the institutional arrangements for decision-making still
remain heavily weighted in favor of the developed countries.83 Biases in
representation and voting power linked to quota contribution will there-
fore continue to impinge on the IMF's neutrality. As long as the IMF
reflects the exclusive will of its major stockholders, it is unlikely to gain
willing acceptance in the developing world. With the emergence of Bra-
zil, Russia, India, and China, 84 the changing world order will look for and
establish alternative fund systems in due course of time.
It would therefore be expedient for the IMF to fundamentally review
its governance structure. It could possibly follow the intrinsic U.S. corpo-
rate model (separating ownership from management) and de-link its gov-
ernance from contributions of the member countries so that the
management, as fiduciaries, could maximize decision-making and value in
an unbiased manner for its member countries. It could further look at
raising financing from the global capital markets instead of relying com-
pletely on the contribution of its members. The IMF could also look at
the creation of regional sub-funds, partly capitalized by the countries in
the region, and partly by accessing global financial markets. This way
81. Id.
82. See IMF, IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power (Aug. 31, 2003), available at
http://imf.org/extemal/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm.
83. See generally Statement by Honourable Finance Minister Mr. P. Chidambaram,
supra note 81.
84. See Roopa Purushothaman & Dominic Wilson, Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to
2050, GLOBAL ECONOMICS PAPER No. 99 (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.gs.
com/insight/research/reports/99.pdf (BRIC economies, Brazil, Russia, India, and
China, together could be larger than the G6 in U.S. dollar terms. By 2025 they
could account for over half the size of the G6. Of the current G6, only the United
States and Japan may be among the six largest economies in U.S. dollar terms in
2050).
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there will be greater ownership among the heterogeneous group of coun-
tries within the region to resolve local issues that they have a far better
understanding of. Regional funds and member countries will have the
discretion to tap the IMF's immense reservoir of expertise in its core ar-
eas of responsibility. Either way, once an equitable governance structure
is established, the IMF could look at expanding its articles to include in-
ternational capital movements as part of the Fund Conditionality.
V. CONCLUSION
The IMF has a mandate to maintain a stable international monetary
system and has oversight of the current account transactions of the mem-
ber countries under its existing Articles of Agreement. But it has felt
compelled to control international capital movements. It is undeniable
that since Bretton Woods, global investment has become a major fuel for
economic growth, and capital movements have an equally strong impact
on balance of payments in any country. Additionally, most developing
countries will not dispute the developmental advantages of a decentral-
ized, deregulated, and private sector ordering. But it is for the respective
countries to choose their pace of development consistent with domestic
social objectives and economic realities, and that the IMF cannot possibly
sit in judgment.
The stellar job done by the IMF since its inception was sullied by its
biased and indiscriminate operations in the 1990s (and even earlier in the
1980s). The IMF's unrelenting obsession with capital account convertibil-
ity created foundation conditions for crisis after crisis in the developing
world. Its package of reforms for countries hit by crises went beyond the
macro-economic and financial sector remedies permitted under its Arti-
cles of Agreement. The IMF's justification that some strong structural
measures were required to restore the confidence of the international in-
vestment community in these countries is meritorious, but was tainted by
its opportunistic procurement of trade and capital account concessions
for and on behalf of its major stockholders. The contagion looming large
from a decade of continuing crises finally jolted the international finan-
cial community. In 2002, the IMF eventually concluded that capital ac-
count liberalization had to be a gradual process accompanied by an
appropriate macro-economic framework, a strong and transparent do-
mestic financial system, and sound structural policies.
The emerging markets are now strong drivers of growth in the world
economy and have begun grumbling about the inequitable representation
and governance at the IMF. The developing world will always see the
IMF as playing the G-7 tune and are unlikely to forget the havoc caused
by the decade of crises around the world. In the spirit of the Monterrey
Consensus, it would be expedient for the IMF to restructure its govern-
ance to reflect the voice of both the developed and developing world.
Thereupon it can, and it should, gain de jure, additional oversight of the
international capital movements.
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